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FOREWORD
The Middle East is again in the midst of turmoil.
While much of the focus is on the sectarian divide
and conflict between Sunni and Shia being played out
in several countries and among different groups, an
equally important division is occurring between secularists and Islamists in a number of Arab countries.
This conflict is particularly acute in the countries of
the so-called Arab Spring. The removal of the authoritarian leaders in these countries has led to intense
competition between Islamists parties and their secular detractors, and the two sides of this divide have
very different visions of where they want their societies to be headed. Islamists initially have an advantage
politically because of their history of being a repressed
opposition movement, their charitable work among
the poor, and their appeal to religion, but secularists,
while weak in terms of grass-roots organization, often have powerful institutional allies in these societies, such as the military, judiciary, and trade unions.
The secularists also tap into a particular strand that
is prevalent in many Arab countries—that religiosity should be a personal decision and not something
imposed by the state or a political movement.
In Egypt, where considerable U.S. interests are at
stake, the Islamist-secularist divide caused problems
for U.S. policymakers, as they were accused of favoring the excesses of either the ruling government or its
opponents, depending on to whom they were speaking. With the intense polarization that accompanied
this divide, U.S. policies were easily misconstrued as
favoring one faction over the other. By the late-spring
and summer of 2013, U.S. standing had dropped to a
low point.
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Mr. Gregory Aftandilian, a Middle East specialist,
analyzes this division and explains why it has become
so intense. He also examines how the United States
has reacted thus far and offers cogent policy recommendations that would help U.S. officials maneuver
through this divide while preserving U.S. interests
and values. He puts forward specific recommendations dealing with countries in the beginning of the
transition period as well as countries already beset by
polarization.
The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings
in this monograph will be of assistance to U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army officers as they deal with the
divide facing a number of Arab countries.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Mr. Gregory Aftandilian examines why the Islamist-secularist divide in such Arab countries as
Egypt and Tunisia has become so intense and polarizing and what can be done, from the perspective of U.S.
policy, to mitigate such divisions and preserve U.S.
interests and values. He demonstrates that having
Islamist parties in dominant positions in Arab societies often provokes a backlash from secular elements
because the latter see the Islamists as threatening their
social freedoms, which leads to unrest. For countries
beginning the transitory process from authoritarianism to democracy, Aftandilian recommends that the
United States press for a broad governing coalition and
a delay in holding elections, similar to what took place
in Italy and France toward the end of World War II
and which aided the moderate parties. Such practices
would allow secular-liberal forces the opportunity to
build their political parties and compete with Islamist
parties. For Arab countries already facing polarization, the United States should be consistent on human
rights, help build up institutions (such as parliaments)
as a hedge against authoritarian presidents, and press
for inclusionary politics. Aftandilian argues that U.S.
assistance should be used as a positive re-enforcer—
to reward moderate and inclusionary politics—rather
than as a punitive lever (cutting aid) because the latter
often provokes a backlash against the United States.
In addition, Aftandilian recommends that U.S. Army
officers should reinforce to their Arab military counterparts the value and necessity of concentrating on
genuine external and internal terrorist threats as opposed to using a coercive internal force that favors
exclusionary politics.
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MANEUVERING THE ISLAMIST-SECULARIST
DIVIDE IN THE ARAB WORLD:
HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN PRESERVE
ITS INTERESTS AND VALUES IN AN
INCREASINGLY POLARIZED ENVIRONMENT
When political analysts and policymakers discuss divisions in the Middle East, they usually refer
to the Sunni-Shia split in the region and conflicts, as
in Syria, that have exacerbated this sectarian division.
However, an equally important division in the region
is the Islamist-secularist1 split, which is most apparent now in Egypt but is also affecting other countries
in the Arab world, such as Tunisia, Libya, and even
the rebels in the Syrian civil war. This split has led
to increased polarization between the Islamist and
secular political camps in these countries, often accompanied by zero-sum politics. The challenge for
U.S. policymakers is for the United States to preserve
and promote its interests and values in these polarized societies, which are increasingly becoming a political minefield, and how to help mitigate such polarization. In some countries, criticism by the United
States of one side of the societal divide is seen by that
side’s supporters as aiding the opposite side. In the
case of Egypt, in particular, both the Islamists (particularly the repressed Muslim Brotherhood) and
the secularists see the United States as having abetted the excesses of the other side in the tumultuous
summer of 2013.
Despite the so-called “Pivot to Asia” that has been
talked about in U.S. national security circles, the United States is likely to remain involved in the Middle
East for some time to come. Even though new oil and
gas discoveries in the United States have made our
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country depend less on Middle East oil, instability
in the region can help drive up prices of these commodities, which would have an adverse effect on the
U.S. economy and that of our allies. In addition, while
there may be some progress in the P5+1 negotiations
with Iran leading to an eventual agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, many of the Gulf Arab states and
Israel are likely to look warily on Iran and would want
a substantial U.S. security presence to remain in the
region as a counterweight to Tehran. Furthermore,
while the leadership core of al-Qaeda has been weakened, there is a now a plethora of al-Qaeda affiliated
groups operating in several Arab countries, like Egypt.
The United States has vital national security objectives
in Egypt, like ensuring the safe and expedited passage
of U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal and overflights for U.S. military aircraft to bring troops to the
Gulf region in the event of a crisis.2
Hence, the Middle East will continue to occupy the
attention of U.S. policymakers and military planners
for the foreseeable future despite the refocus on Asia.
The United States needs to be able to deal better with
the Islamist-secularist division in the area if it hopes to
retain its interests there.
WHY HAS THE ISLAMIST-SECULARIST SPLIT
BECOME SO VIRULENT AND POLARIZING?
AN EXAMINATION OF EGYPT AND TUNISIA
Prior to the Arab Spring of 2011, most countries in
this region were ruled by authoritarian leaders who
suppressed both Islamist and secular-liberal oppositionists. In so-called republican regimes, power was
concentrated in the hands of the president, who was
aided by a ruling party that was, in essence, merely
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an extension of the state apparatus and not an independent institution. Such regimes repressed Islamist
parties, even those that eschewed violence, in part
because they were afraid that these parties or organizations would challenge the legitimacy of their rule
as heads of Muslim states. But these regimes also suppressed secular-liberal parties and dissidents because
they challenged the repressive security apparatus
and could be seen as alternative political players by
Western governments, particularly the United States.
Hence, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood by periodically arresting its activists to keep the organization off-balance
and from participating unhindered in the sham of the
political process that characterized his rule. He also
went after liberal detractors, like Ayman Nour, who
criticized the Egyptian leader for the lack of democracy and the repression of dissent, particularly when
the United States seemed to look with favor on such
oppositionists.3
Many citizens who could be classified as secularliberals often muted their criticism of the regimes,
especially when the countries faced challenges from
Islamist extremist groups who employed violence.
The secular-liberals even lent tacit support at times
to the state under the adage that it is better to deal
with the devil you know than the devil you do not
know. Although they understood and resented the
fact that these regimes were ossified and repressive,
the secular-liberals at least could be free socially rather than conforming to a very strict interpretation of
sharia (Islamic law) that the extremists, and even many
nonviolent Islamists, seemed to favor. In other words,
many saw the secular-orientated authoritarian state as
a hedge against a takeover by the Islamists, who were
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seen as narrow-minded when it came to social norms
and practices. The secular-liberals resented the implicit message by the Muslim Brotherhood and other
Islamist groups that they were “not Muslim enough.”
Such secular-liberals believed that neither the state
nor a political organization should meddle in their
decisions about how devout or not they want to be.
In their minds, religiosity should be left to the individual or the family and not be imposed on society.
Such sentiments—essentially a separation of mosque
from state--were even accepted by many devout
Muslim citizens who were wary of Islamist parties.4
Additionally, many secular-liberals questioned the
pronouncements of the Islamists, even those from the
nonviolent and more moderate groups, who claimed
that their organizations were committed to democracy. Attempts to form opposition alliances between
secular and Islamist groups were often rife with discord, and many secularists were deeply troubled by
the writings of some Muslim Brotherhood leaders who
seemed to favor second-class status for Christians and
women and an Islamic litmus test for laws passed by
parliament.5
At the same time, the authoritarian regimes, faced
with population pressures and increasingly scarce
government resources, ceded much of the social welfare space to the Islamists. For example, in Egypt,
through their charitable organizations, the Muslim
Brotherhood established food banks and health clinics
in poor urban and rural areas, often as an ancillary
extension of neighborhood mosques. Although occasionally hassled by government security agents, these
centers were generally tolerated by the state because
they provided essential social services that the state
could no longer provide and helped to keep the popu-
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lation quiet.6 From the Brotherhood’s perspective,
such activities not only “proved” to the people that
the organization cared about their economic plight
and fulfilled Muslim obligations of charity to the poor,
but also helped maintain the organization’s support
among a significant segment of the population. In a
country rife with corruption, such activities were also
seen as altruistic and “clean” by many ordinary citizens, particularly among the semi-educated strata of
society, who, along with many middle class liberals,
resented the outward displays of wealth by the new
class of “crony capitalists” who emerged during the
Mubarak era.
The people who initially took to the streets during the revolutions in the Arab world in 2011 were
mostly young people of secular-liberal middle-class
backgrounds. They were mainly educated and savvy
in the ways of social media; they wanted a meaningful and well-paying job, dignity, political freedom,
an end to police harassment and brutality, and an accountable government. The Islamist parties initially
were hesitant to join the demonstrations because they
were not sure of the outcome and did not want to set
themselves up for another round of repression by the
security services. But eventually some Islamist youth,
in defiance of their elders in the organizations, did join
their secular counterparts in the demonstrations in the
early days because they shared similar goals.7
The toppling of several authoritarian leaders in the
Arab world was initially greeted by huge displays of
national unity, by Muslims and Christians, as well as
Islamists and secularists. However, this unity dissipated not long after the revolutions because Islamists and
secularists in particular had different visions of their
society, and these differences would soon play out in
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the political arena. Islamist parties seemed to understand their strength from early on in the process, and
pushed for elections. They successfully tapped into
their networks across the country—particularly in
Egypt—and into the perception among many citizens
(both in Tunisia and Egypt) that they were a principled opposition party during the dark days of the authoritarian regime who were not tainted by corruption
and hence would provide a good alternative to who
had ruled them before. The secular–liberal camp was
divided and lacked grass-roots appeal. It was mostly
congregated in the major urban centers of Cairo and
Alexandria and had little outreach to the urban poor,
let alone the rural poor. Some were followers of the
old liberal parties, like the Wafd, which was formed in
the nationalist ferment of the post-World War I years.
Others were newly formed “revolutionary” parties
that took part in the 2011 revolutions and were good
at returning to demonstrations as a tactic but poor at
organizing politically, especially in rural areas.8
It was not surprising, therefore, that in this context,
the Islamist parties did very well in the immediate
post-authoritarian elections while the secular-liberal
parties did poorly. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, for
example, won 47 percent of the seats in parliamentary
elections in late-2011 and early-2012, while the even
more fundamentalist Salafi parties won about 23 percent of the seats. These results compare with secularliberal parties winning only about 20 percent of the
seats overall. In Tunisia, the main Islamist party, EnNahda, won the largest plurality of votes (37 percent)
and the largest plurality of seats (41 percent), while
the second largest vote-getter, the secular Congress
for the Republic party, won only 8.7 percent of the
vote and 13 percent of the seats.9
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In Egypt, the presidential elections of May and
June 2012 produced a Muslim Brotherhood president,
Mohammad Morsi, who edged out a secular candidate, Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak’s last prime minister
and a former head of the air force, in a close race. In
the first round of these elections, which saw multiple
candidates, Morsi received only 25 percent of the vote,
but he was able to win in the second round because
of several factors: many Egyptians, disliking both
candidates, stayed home, which worked to the advantage of Morsi because the Brotherhood mobilized its
supporters to come out and vote; many of the young,
secular revolutionaries from 2011 could not stomach a
Shafik presidency because of his close association with
Mubarak and the old regime and thus threw their support behind Morsi. Morsi cleverly portrayed himself
as being a presidential candidate for “all Egyptians,”
implying he would create an inclusive government.
These factors were enough, in the end, to tip the vote
in his favor.10 Egypt’s lower house of parliament,
which was mentioned earlier and was dominated by
the Brotherhood, was disbanded by the courts over
a technicality in early-June 2012, but the less powerful Shura, or upper house of parliament, which had
a Brotherhood majority, remained intact. Thus, by
mid-summer 2012, the Brotherhood controlled both
the executive and legislative branches of the Egyptian
government.
In Tunisia, En-Nahda ruled in a coalition with two
small secular parties, the Congress for the Republic
(mentioned earlier) and Ettakatol. As a measure of
compromise, the president and speaker of parliament
were from the secular parties, while the prime minister was from En-Nahda. But since the power in the
new Tunisian political system was titled much more
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heavily in the direction of parliament than the presidency, En-Nahda, because of its prominent role in the
coalition and its control of the premiership, became
the dominant political force in the country.11
While in power, these leading Islamist parties acted
in ways that were seen as either authoritarian (Egypt)
or as pursuing policies that were seen as eventually
changing the nature of society (Tunisia and Egypt).
Moreover, several actions by these Islamist parties
seemed to elicit the worst fears of the secularists in
those societies. President Morsi, immediately after
brokering a truce between Hamas and Israel in November 2012, which received praise from the international community and particularly the United States,
issued a decree that said that his presidential decisions
would be exempt from judicial review—essentially
placing himself above the law. This decree touched
off a huge political firestorm in Egypt, leading to violent clashes between the Brotherhood and its liberal
detractors in late-2012 and early-2013.12 In Tunisia, the
assassination of two secular leaders—one, Chokri Belaid of the Popular Front who was killed in February
2013, and another, Mohammed Brahmi, a leftist trade
union leader who was killed in July 2013 by probable
Islamist extremists—caused Tunisia’s secular parties to blame En-Nahda for either not cracking down
enough on such extremists or creating a permissive
environment in which the extremists could operate in
the open.13
In retrospect, it appears that such policies or the
seeming indifference of the Islamist parties to the
extremists rekindled secularists’ fears of an Islamist
takeover of these societies, not just politically but in
terms of transforming them into strict and intolerant states whereby personal and cultural freedoms
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would be jeopardized. Ideological differences between Islamists and liberals are quite profound,
as the scholar Shadi Hamid has pointed out. In a
recent study, he noted that, while it was campaigning, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt espoused a
“civilizational project” that, within the framework of
democracy:
offered a spiritual and philosophical alternative to
Western liberalism. For Islamists as well as their liberal opponents, it was a question—one that was intensely personal—of how societies would be ordered.
Any moral project could be counted on to intrude
on private conduct and personal freedoms, on the
very choices that citizens made, or didn’t make, on a
daily basis.14

In the same study, he underscored:
Even what may have seemed, in retrospect, like minor quibbles—over the particular wording of sharia
clauses, for example—reflected fundamental divides
over boundaries, limits, and purpose of the nationstate. For liberals, certain rights and freedoms are, by
definition, non-negotiable. They envision the state as a
neutral arbiter. Meanwhile, even those Islamists who
have little interest in legislating morality see the state
as a promoter of a certain set of religious and moral
values, through the soft power of the state machinery, the educational system, and the media. For them,
these conservative values are not ideologically driven
but represent a self-evident popular consensus around
the role of religion in public life. The will of the people,
particularly when it coincides with the will of God,
takes precedence over any presumed international
human-rights norms.15
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In part because of these sharp differences in views
about how society should be governed, Egypt in late2012 and early-2013 witnessed violent clashes between
secularists and Brotherhood supporters. Scores of
Brotherhood offices were attacked and torched, even
in the city of Ismailiya, where the Brotherhood was
founded in 1928.16 In Tunisia, in 2013, the assassination of two secular leaders, mentioned earlier, set off
large street demonstrations against En-Nahda.
Some Islamist leaders like Morsi blamed “remnants of the former regimes” for much of this agitation. While there is an element of truth in this charge,
it appears that the Islamist parties miscalculated by
not appreciating the depth of anger and fear that the
non-Islamist citizenry and political parties had toward
the Islamists.17 In Egypt, this anger eventually gathered steam and support through the Tamarod (rebel)
movement—a petition drive to compel Morsi to hold
new presidential elections, which was supported by
the leading secular parties that formed a coalition
called the National Salvation Front. Millions of Egyptians signed the petition, though the exact number is
the subject of some dispute, and throngs of citizens
gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and other venues to
demand Morsi’s resignation.18 These demonstrations
prompted the Brotherhood to stage counterdemonstrations in other parts of Cairo in support of Morsi.
The Egyptian military then entered into the political
fray by calling on both sides to compromise for the
sake of the country’s stability, though it soon became
apparent that the military’s loyalties were with the
anti-Morsi crowds. After Defense Minister Abdel Fatah al-Sissi held a private meeting with Morsi, during which Morsi refused to compromise, the military
stepped in and ousted him, placing him under arrest.
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It then appointed an interim civilian government
under the leadership of Adly Mansour, head of the
Supreme Constitutional Court, who became interim
president, though al-Sissi clearly was the power
behind the scene.19
During the course of the next several weeks in
Egypt, the military and police forces mounted an aggressive campaign against the Brotherhood, arresting hundreds of its leaders. In mid-August 2013, the
Egyptian security forces violently broke up the proMorsi protest encampments in Cairo, during which
over 500 Brotherhood supporters and some 42 police
were killed.20 Egypt then descended into a very violent period, when scores of Coptic Christian churches
and police stations were attacked by Brotherhood
supporters, while several hundred more Brotherhood
activists were killed by the security forces and thousands more were arrested.21 In the meantime, Islamist
extremist groups emanating from the Sinai Peninsula
embarked on a terror campaign against the new regime, the police, and the military from the summer
of 2013 to the winter of 2014; at least 300 security personnel were killed by those extremists in either bomb
attacks or armed clashes. The new regime lumped the
Brotherhood and the Islamist extremists together as a
common foe, and in late-December 2013 declared the
Brotherhood to be a “terrorist organization.”22
Facing widespread anger from secularists—particularly from trade unionists and the liberal and leftist
intelligentsia, some of whom formed their own “Tamarod campaign”—and seeing what had happened
to the Brotherhood in Egypt, En-Nahda decided to
compromise. After many weeks of negotiations with
secular elements and parties, in September 2013, EnNahda agreed to relinquish the premiership and its
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dominant position in the government.23 A technocratic
interim government was appointed in its stead in early-2014, and various elements within the Tunisian polity convened and rewrote the constitution, which has
since been deemed to be one of the most progressive
constitutions in the Arab world.24 Elections to a new
parliament are expected to take place later in 2014.
Thus, the Islamist-secularist divide has played out
very differently in Egypt and Tunisia. Although both
societies were and remain deeply split, the divide in
Egypt resulted in extensive violence and the incarceration of over 10,000 oppositionists (mostly Brotherhood activists and supporters), whereas the divide in
Tunisia has resulted in peaceful political compromise,
though with the Islamist party losing its dominant
position.
HOW HAS THE UNITED STATES RESPONDED
SO FAR TO THE ISLAMIST-SECULARIST
DIVIDE?
The Arab Spring of 2011 brought about a new assessment within U.S. policy circles about the U.S. approach to Islamist parties. Although prior to that, the
United States did maintain ties with a few Islamist
parties in some Arab countries—for example, in postSaddam Iraq and Morocco—it was reluctant to upset
the leaders of other Arab countries, like Mubarak of
Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia, who made it known that
they would view as hostile any relationship between
the United States and such parties or organizations.
When those regimes were overthrown and the Islamist
parties became legal, U.S. policy adjusted accordingly.
U.S. policymakers sought to cultivate ties with these
parties because they were the best organized within
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the polity and appeared to be the most popular in several countries. Consequently, in Egypt, especially during the first year after the 2011 revolution, when U.S.
officials traveled to Cairo, they would usually visit the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the
Brotherhood, while bypassing or giving short shrift
to the secular-liberal parties.25 Although the plethora
of such secular-liberal parties meant that it would be
very difficult logistically to meet each one of them in
their own headquarters—U.S. officials often preferred
to meet them in a group setting in one location—it
gave the impression that the United States was interested only in the military and the Brotherhood, two
illiberal organizations, to the detriment of what the
other parties believed were the true democratic and
liberal forces.26
As can be imagined, the U.S. approach did not sit
well with most of the secular-liberal parties. It became
conventional thinking among the secular-liberal intelligentsia in Egypt that the United States had put all of
its eggs in the Muslim Brotherhood’s basket, and this
feeling was reinforced during the Morsi presidency.27
The United States was relatively silent when, in lateNovember 2012, Morsi declared his decrees to be no
longer subject to judicial review, because he had just
worked with Hamas to broker a truce with Israel after
a flare-up occurred between the two belligerents. After praising Morsi for brokering this truce, the United
States apparently did not want to upset him by turning on his undemocratic domestic policies, but that
policy only fed conspiracy theories in Egypt of U.S.Brotherhood collusion.
Perhaps more importantly, U.S. officials, at least
initially, did not seem to understand how polarizing
the Muslim Brotherhood was in Egyptian politics. The
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fact that Morsi won the presidency did not mean that a
majority of Egyptians had adopted the Brotherhood’s
agenda. He won for the reasons mentioned earlier, and
the Brotherhood’s true support was probably around
25 percent of the populace.28 When Morsi issued his
controversial November 22, 2012, decree, this latent
anti-Brotherhood sentiment came to the fore. When
Morsi rushed through a referendum on a constitution
that was drafted primarily by his Brotherhood allies
the following month, the anger of his substantial number of detractors also burst onto the surface.29
Moreover, Morsi also seemed to have underestimated the strength of the secular-liberals in Egyptian
society. The fact that the political parties representing this segment of society did poorly at the polls and
did not have a mass base obscured the strength and
resiliency of this group, which also had allies in the
Egyptian judiciary. Hence, by misreading the election
results (both of the parliamentary and presidential
elections), U.S. policymakers seemed to have concluded that the secular-liberals were an insignificant
force. It was not surprising, therefore, that U.S. officials seemed to have concluded that continuing their
relationship with the Brotherhood—especially because Morsi hailed from that organization—was the
only logical policy.
By the time the United States had a change of heart
toward Morsi—stepping up criticism of his repressive
domestic policies in early-2013—it had already lost
the support of Egypt’s entire secular-liberal intelligentsia.30 Although the United States was cognizant of this
estrangement on the part of the secular-liberals and
tried to mend fences with them—in early-March 2013,
for example, Secretary of State Kerry stated upon his
arrival in Cairo, “I come here on behalf of President
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Obama, committed not to any party, not to any one
person, not to any specific political point of view.”31
Such comments did little to assuage the concerns of
Morsi’s many detractors.
That same spring, young, secular activists started
the Tamarod (rebel) campaign, which was essentially
a petition drive to compel Morsi to hold new presidential elections. The campaign hoped to receive more
signatures from Egyptian citizens than the amount
of votes Morsi received as a presidential candidate,
thereby delegitimizing his presidency. The Tamarod activists were supported by a coalition of secular opposition parties called the National Salvation
Front, which was made up of some of the country’s
leading oppositionists at the time—former Foreign
Minister and Arab League Secretary General, Amre
Moussa; former International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and chief Mohammad El-Baradei, who was
head of the Constitution party; and socialist politician
Hamdeen Sabahi.32
U.S. policymakers, while recognizing the mounting opposition to Morsi and the Brotherhood, still
believed they had no choice but to deal with Morsi,
who, despite all of his faults, was the democratically elected president of Egypt. On June 18, 2013, U.S.
Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson delivered a
speech in Cairo in which she tried to dispel notions of
a U.S.-Brotherhood conspiracy and explain why the
United States maintained relations with Morsi, saying
that the United States would work with whoever won
elections that met international standards. However,
the most controversial aspect of her speech was her
indirect criticism of the Tamarod campaign. She expressed skepticism that street protests would produce
better results than elections and called on Egyptians to
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“roll up their sleeves” and work hard to join and build
political parties “because there is no other way.”33 A
few days later, Patterson met with Khairat al-Shater,
not a government official but a Brotherhood leader, in
an effort to have him persuade Morsi to reach out to
the opposition. Although this message did not make
any headway, the mere fact that such a meeting took
place fed the secular-liberals’ conspiracy theories of
a U.S.-Brotherhood alliance.34 From the standpoint
of many within this camp in Egypt, the United States
was not a neutral party but a facilitator of Morsi and
the Brotherhood’s authoritarian policies.35 Anti-U.S.
sentiment, already high, increased among the secularliberals, and Patterson’s image was crudely depicted
on placards carried by the anti-Morsi demonstrators
who gathered in Tahrir Square and elsewhere.36
Thus, by the time that Morsi was overthrown by
the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013, with the concurrence of millions of Egyptian citizens, the U.S.
standing in Egypt had reached a low point. There was
a widespread belief among anti-Brotherhood Egyptians that the United States had aided and abetted
the Morsi government and thus was complicit in its
authoritarian and sometimes repressive policies.37 The
United States tried to steer a middle course after Morsi
was overthrown. President Barack Obama, while acknowledging the “legitimate grievances of the Egyptian people,” nonetheless said the United States was
“deeply concerned by the decision of the armed forces
to remove President Morsi and suspend the constitution.”38 Hoping not to burn its bridges with the Egyptian military, however, the United States did not call
Morsi’s removal a coup because that would have led
to an immediate cutoff of U.S. aid under existing U.S.
legislation. This middle course, however, satisfied no
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one in Egypt. The Egyptian military and the secularliberals were upset that the United States criticized
what had happened on July 3, believing it was a genuine revolution that should have been supported by
Washington,39 while the Muslim Brotherhood, seeing
the U.S. reluctance to call Morsi’s ouster a coup, believed that the United States had given the Egyptian
military a “green light” to remove their president.40
Subsequent attempts by the United States and the
European Union (EU) that summer to bring about reconciliation between the new Egyptian authorities and
the Brotherhood failed. Although the United States
still refused to call Morsi’s ouster a coup, it held up
the delivery of F-16 jets to Egypt, in early-August
2013, probably as a lever on the new Egyptian government led behind the scenes by Defense Minister
al-Sissi. But even this small slap on the wrist was
criticized by al-Sissi as “not the way to treat a patriotic military.”41 When the Egyptian military authorities, against the advice of the United States, violently
broke up the pro-Morsi protest encampments in Cairo
in mid-August 2013, with much loss of life, President
Obama interrupted his vacation to denounce the actions as “deplorable.” Obama then decided to suspend
the Bright Star joint military exercises with Egypt and
added that his administration would review U.S. military aid. In October 2013, the Obama administration
decided to suspend most military equipment sales to
Egypt, though it continued to provide the more modest economic assistance as well as some counterterrorism aid.42 The U.S. Congress also exerted its influence
on the military assistance issue. While approving the
usual $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid in the FY14 Omnibus spending bill, Congress attached conditions on
it, such as dividing the aid into two tranches and tying
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this assistance to Egypt’s reaching certain democratic
benchmarks that would have to be certified by the
Obama administration.43
This military aid suspension and the conditionality placed on it led to even more friction in the U.S.Egyptian bilateral relationship. It did not, moreover,
lead to any lessening of the Egyptian government’s
repression of the Brotherhood (and some liberal detractors of military rule), as some policymakers might
have hoped. Although in April 2014, Secretary of
State Kerry announced that the United States would
resume the delivery of 10 Apache helicopters to Egypt
because of their importance in counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists in the
Sinai, he emphasized that this delivery was related to
counterterrorism assistance44 (which was exempt from
congressional conditionality on U.S. aid to Egypt).
Kerry, while acknowledging some progress in Egypt,
such as the passage of the new constitution, was reluctant to certify that Egypt had met the democratic
benchmarks enunciated by Congress—in part because
an Egyptian court had just issued hundreds of death
sentences against Brotherhood activists and supporters, which several influential members of Congress
had criticized. Some members of Congress also were
critical of the Egyptian government’s arrest of some
journalists and some secular activists, who came to
criticize the military’s rule. Given that these convictions and arrests were seen as egregious violations of
human rights, the U.S. State Department also issued
condemnations of them.45
In Tunisia, the United States was largely spared
the wrath it encountered in Egypt. Although a similar (though smaller) Tamarod campaign took place
in Tunisia against En-Nahda in the summer of 2013
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in the aftermath of the assassination of leftist leader
Brahmi, such demonstrations,46 led in part by trade
unions, were not accompanied by an anti-U.S. agenda.
This may be explained by the fact that the U.S. role in
Tunisia never matched that in Egypt, both in terms of
aid and visibility, and Tunisia’s closest relationship in
the West was with France (its former colonial power),
not the United States.
In contrast to the situation in Egypt, which led U.S.
policymakers to go through all kinds of political contortions to try to steer a middle course as the military
and security forces cracked down hard against the
Muslim Brotherhood, U.S. officials heaped praise on
Tunisia’s political factions for reaching a compromise
in 2013 without violence. U.S. officials participated in
the inauguration ceremony marking the passage of
Tunisia’s new constitution in January 2014,47 and Secretary Kerry flew to Tunis the following month and
stated on his arrival:
I wanted to come here today to confirm on behalf of
the American people and President Obama our commitment to stand with Tunisia and the people of Tunisia and to help move down this road to democracy.48

He added that Tunisia’s new constitution “is
grounded in democratic principles, equality, freedom,
security, economic opportunity, and the rule of law.”
It is a constitution, Kerry continued, “that can serve
as a model for others in the region and around the
world.”49 In April 2014, Tunisia’s interim prime minister Mehdi Jomaa, an independent technocrat, was
welcomed in the White House by President Obama.
Obama said that while some Arab countries have
had difficulty in the transition process, “in Tunisia,
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where it all began, we have seen the kind of progress
that I think all of us had been hoping for, although
it’s been full of challenges.”50 That same month, the
United States announced it would provide Tunisia
with a $500 million loan guarantee that would make
it easier for Tunisia to borrow money abroad; this was
the second loan guarantee that the United States provided Tunisia; the first one was given in 2012 for $485
million.51
Clearly, the United States was holding up Tunisia as a model for other Arab transition countries to
emulate, and was rewarding it with financial support.
The underlying message was that the United States
favors compromise between Islamists and secularists,
and wants such compromises to be settled peacefully. The problem is that the confluence of forces that
made peaceful compromise work in Tunisia—a strong
middle class, a secularist tradition going back to the
days of the French protectorate, a vibrant and secular
trade union movement, and a more politically savvy
Islamist party that saw the writing on the wall (if it
did not compromise it might have faced the same fate
as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt)—may be, and
probably is, absent in other Arab countries.52 Hence,
while it was proper for the United States to praise and
reward Tunisia (in contrast to Egypt) for the way it
handled its political disputes, U.S. policymakers cannot rely on other “Tunisias” to appear. Instead, it must
deal with more complicated and problematic countries that are likely to chart a different path. Nonetheless, there are some lessons that can be drawn from the
Tunisian experience that U.S. policymakers can work
toward like the value of coalitions. Before countries
experience extreme polarization and violence, as we
have witnessed in Egypt, where the United States does
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not have much room to maneuver, the United States
can fashion policy prescriptions for what it would like
to see in Arab transition countries.
HOW DO U.S. INTERESTS AND VALUES LINE
UP WITH POLITICAL FORCES IN THE ARAB
TRANSITION COUNTRIES?
The preceding analysis has shown that having Islamists in power either exclusively or in a dominant
position tends to be a lightning rod for non-Islamist
groups in Arab societies. Whether real or imagined,
secularist elements of society see Islamist groups as
threatening their way of life, and more specifically,
their personal freedoms. The question arises whether
the United States has any role to play in this process.
In other words, should it simply stand aside and let
the politics play out in these societies, or should it try
to influence the course of events to seek one outcome
over another? Would playing such a role in these societies constitute egregious interference in their internal affairs, or, because of the widespread perception
in these societies that the United States is somehow
involved in their internal affairs anyway, does it even
matter that the United States declares that it has a policy toward Arab transition countries?
In addition, would it make sense for the United
States to have two policies on the Islamist-secularist
divide, one to be applied before the transition gets
under way and the other if and when these societies
are polarized and politics become a zero-sum game?
This monograph argues that such a two-tier approach
is warranted, with the understanding that the United States may not succeed in either case, because it
will be the peoples and leaders in these societies who
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will ultimately choose which path to follow, and they
may wish to disregard U.S. advice. Nonetheless, the
United States should at least try to develop and carry
out a policy of dealing with this divide as opposed to
reacting to events on an ad hoc basis.
This monograph also argues that it is in the U.S.
interest not to favor a dominant position for Islamist
parties in Arab countries for both foreign and domestic policy reasons. Although historically, secular-nationalists in the Arab world (such as Egypt’s Gamal
Abdel Nasser) have been as much opposed to U.S.
foreign policies in the region as have Islamist movements, there can be a mending of fences between such
secular nationalist governments if some foreign policy
problems can be addressed. For example, Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, one of his comrades in the Free
Officers organization, which overthrew the Egyptian
monarch in 1952, was able to establish close ties to the
United States in the 1970s once U.S. policy was committed to the peace process and helped Egypt retrieve
the Sinai Peninsula from the Israelis. This is not to say
that an Islamist government cannot cooperate with
the United States from time to time on some issues, as
occurred between Morsi and the United States during
the Gaza flare-up in November 2012. But Islamist parties, because they are wedded ideologically to a particular worldview, which sees the West not just as a
political opponent but a nefarious power that wants
to change the nature of their societies, are particularly
loathe to be seen cooperating with the United States
and the West in general.53 It should be remembered
that the Muslim Brotherhood’s main mission when it
was formed in the late-1920s was to counter Western
influence in Egypt, believing that much of Egyptian
society has forsaken its Islamic roots because of this
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Westernization, and the Brotherhood still believes in
the Islamization of society.54 In other words, opposition by Islamists to the West and the United States is
not just political, but fundamentally cultural. They
can still view the United States as an enemy even after
resolving some political issues. By contrast, secularists
by and large do not have this deep cultural antipathy toward the United States. For all of his anti-U.S.
stances, for example, Nasser admired American society, and was particularly fond of American movies.55
On domestic issues, the United States is more in
tune with the secular-liberal groups in terms of their
values and support for human rights. Although some
secular groups in the Arab world believe that the sharia has a role to play in the formulation of laws passed
by parliament—for example, even the post-Morsi new
Egyptian constitution, passed in January 2014, states
that the principles of sharia are the main source of legislation56—secular-liberals generally believe that religiosity should not be forced on society by either the
state or a political party, and that political freedoms of
press, speech, and assembly are sacrosanct. As of this
writing, the conflict between sharia and human rights
has become problematic in Egypt because, while the
new constitution guarantees these rights (including
gender equality), the military-backed authorities in
Egypt have restricted such freedoms in the interest of
stability and “preventing chaos.”57 Nonetheless, with
these values and rights enshrined in the new constitution, U.S. officials and secular-liberal activists can
hold political leaders accountable to these standards.
Moreover, old draconian laws can be done away with
by a new parliament that is committed to the application of international norms and rights.
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Finally, it is also in the U.S. interest for Arab countries to be stable and not go through violent upheavals
on a monthly basis. This means that, while it is not in
the U.S. interest (for the reasons mentioned above) to
have Islamist parties in a dominant position in these
countries because these parties are so polarizing, it is
also not in the U.S. interest for these countries under
secular rule to practice exclusionary politics in which
they shut out nonviolent Islamist parties from participating in the political system. In Tunisia, after EnNahda agreed to compromise and relinquished power, a secular political leader said that he would not be
averse to having En-Nahda in a coalition government
with his party after new parliamentary elections are
held in the latter part of 2014. After the political turmoil in Tunisia in 2013, this was seen as a statement
of reconciliation of sorts.58 Unfortunately, in Egypt
right now, we are witnessing the opposite situation.
The Egyptian authorities have designated the Muslim
Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and there appears no chance of reconciliation over the short term.59
The severe crackdown on the Brotherhood in the summer of 2013 may have driven some elements of the
Brotherhood to commit acts of violence, and hence
the regime’s terrorist labeling of the Brotherhood may
have actually become a self-fulfilling prophecy. There
are certainly genuine Islamist terrorist groups in
Egypt to the right of the Brotherhood that have committed numerous acts of violence against the regime,
but the Egyptian government’s inclination is to lump
all Islamist groups together and say it faces a terrorist
threat from them all.60 This type of exclusionary politics is unlikely to bring stability to Egypt, and even
some secular-liberals who are opposed to the Brotherhood understand the potential danger of exclusion-
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ary politics.61 The following historical analogy may
be illustrative of what worked in the past in another part of the world in which the United States was
deeply involved, and may be of benefit to U.S. policymakers who are seeking optimal outcomes in Arab
transition countries.
Post-World War II Strategy in Western Europe
as an Analogy.
Although the Arab world and Western Europe represent different cultures, and some observers may resent a comparison of Islamism (using Islam as a political ideology) with Communism, there are lessons that
the United States can draw from the past about how
new political systems, parties, and elections emerged
in post-war Italy and France that have applicability to
political transitions in the Arab world.
In Italy, for example, after the liberation of Rome
in 1944 but before the end of the war in 1945, various
political groups formed the Committee of National
Liberation. This council was comprised of the newly
formed Christian Democrats, the Communists, Socialists, the Action Party, and the liberals. This coalition
lasted until 1947. There were several reasons for this
cooperation: 1) the war was still going on in 1944 and
in the first half of 1945, and non-fascist Italians wanted to show the outside world that Italians themselves
could take charge of their country while fighting the
Germans and the remnants of Mussolini’s regime in
cooperation with the Allies; 2) the Communists were
under instructions from Moscow to participate in coalition governments; and 3) the Christian Democrats,
as a new party, needed time to develop and did not
want to hinder the anti-fascist coalition. The Italian
Communist Party, because of its prominent role in
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the anti-German and anti-Italian fascist resistance,
was clearly the up-and-coming party in 1945. By the
end of 1945, the Communist party had about 1.76 million members and controlled many sections of Italy.62
One Communist party cadre from Sesto San Giovanni
explained later, “At the time, the party at Sesto was
everything. Instead of going to the local government
offices, people came to us, at the Rondo, for housing,
for jobs, for welfare assistance.”63
As one of the leading experts on the history of
Italian politics has written:
Both the left-wing parties [the Communists and the
Socialists] were convinced that as soon as elections
were held, they would emerge as the majority force
in the country. They were therefore prepared to make
substantial concession to the Christian Democrats and
the Liberals to ensure that elections were not unduly
delayed. Left-wing ministers behaved with great restraint in order to avoid alienating their Christian
Democrat colleagues.64
All of this played straight into [head of the Christian
Democratic party] DeGaspari’s hands. Sensing the
ductility of the left, he gained concessions where he
could while still managing to postpone the date of
general elections. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, he
was in frequent touch with the Allies, who intervened
to express their desire for local elections to precede national ones. The reasoning was simple: the longer the
‘molten lava of 1945,’ to use Lombardi’s expression,
had time to cool, the more chance the moderates had.
DeGaspari threatened a governmental crisis unless
his viewpoint was accepted. General elections were
finally fixed for the spring of 1946, later than any other
country that had been under Nazi occupation.65
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In these elections held in June 1946, the Christian
Democrats emerged as the party with the largest plurality, winning 35.2 percent of the vote. The Communists won 18.9 percent, while the Socialist party won
20.7 percent of the vote. Although the combined vote
of the Communists and the Marxist-oriented Socialist
party was slightly higher than the Christian Democrats, these two parties could not dominate the coalition government as they had initially hoped. Other
developments occurred in subsequent years to further
weaken the Marxist left in Italy. In May 1947, DeGasperi, backed by the United States, which had just announced the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Western
Europe, felt strong enough to dismiss the Communists
and Socialists from his cabinet; a more moderate faction within the Socialist party broke away from the
party to form a new party; and Moscow gave instructions to Western European Communist parties to no
longer participate in coalition governments. When
new elections were held in Italy in April 1948, the
Christian Democrats scored even more gains, winning
48.5 percent of the vote, while the combined Communist and left-wing Socialist parties won 30.1 percent of
the vote.66
In France, the three main anti-collaborationist parties—Communists, the Socialists, and France’s equivalent of the Christian Democrats, called the Popular
Republican Movement—became part of a coalition
government formed after Paris was liberated in August 1944, and was under the leadership of General
Charles DeGaulle of the Free French Forces until 1946.
This government was called “The Provisional Government of the French Republic,” and it governed France
until 1947, similar to what had occurred in Italy. If
elections had been held immediately after the war,
there was a good chance that the Communists would
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have emerged as the dominant political party because
of their prominent role in the resistance.67 Instead,
elections were put off until the non-Communist forces
were in a better position to contest the elections.
The lesson that can be drawn from these experiences is that Italy and France were in a state of deep
political turmoil toward the end of World War II. The
old regimes—the collaborationist Vichy government
and Mussolini’s fascist government—were discredited, and the anti-fascist groups were jockeying for
position. They settled on coalition governments in
1944—with support from outside powers—as the best
way to bring stability and redemption to their countries. The moderate parties realized that a rush to elections would aid the Communists, because they were
the best organized of the resistance groups. Hence,
national elections for parliament were delayed by the
moderate parties in order for them to build up their
national followings. So, when national elections were
held in 1946, the Communists were not in a position
to dominate the political scene. Outside powers also
contributed to this process. Both the United States and
the Soviet Union aided the non-Communists and the
Communists, respectively, but the non-Communists
were able to prevail.68 Although the Communists continued to participate in the parliamentary systems in
Italy and France, and were able to retain a significant
following in subsequent years—even winning control
of some municipalities—they were never in a position to dominate the national politics of either country
completely.
The lessons that can be drawn from these experiences are: 1) political coalitions from a transitional
country’s political factions can be a stabilizing force
in the aftermath of the fall of a discredited regime; 2)
delaying elections can give moderate parties a chance
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to develop and level the political playing field; 3) inclusionary politics—allowing all political factions,
including more radical elements, to participate in
elections—can be a stabilizing factor; and, 4) outside
powers can play a positive role by working with their
ideological allies in support of coalition politics.
Although in 1947 the Communists were excluded
from government in both Italy and France, non-Communists did not make them illegal. If they had done
so, it is likely that Italy and France would have experienced more instability in the post-war period, since the
Communists were influential in the labor unions and
among the intellectual classes. Forcing the Communists underground may have led to act of subversion
and sabotage, which would have caused numerous
problems in these societies and hindered the development of a Western security umbrella under U.S. leadership. Although at the time, the United States was
not pleased that the French and Italian Communist
parties, which were pro-Moscow, remained legal entities in these countries, especially at the time when the
Cold War had solidified. In retrospect, keeping these
parties in the political system (though not in government) proved to be a wise policy.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Dealing with Countries Immediately after the
Overthrow or Resignation of the Autocrat.
This monograph posits seven recommendations:
1. As the examples of Italy and France in the immediate post-war years have shown (as has Tunisia
post-2013), it is best for achieving stability and lessening the chances of polarization for Arab transition
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countries to adopt coalition governments immediately after the fall of a discredited autocratic leader. The
United States should encourage the remaining institutions of the old regimes, such as the military and the
judiciary, which perhaps have not been overly tainted
by repression, and the countries’ political forces to
come up with a suitable formula of party representation in these new governments. Given how polarizing
Islamist parties are among secular groups, it should be
emphasized to the power brokers that while Islamists
should have a significant presence in these coalitions,
they should not have a majority position in them. If
a visible U.S. role in this endeavor would be seen as
counterproductive by the political players, the United
States should work together with its regional allies behind the scenes, with the political factions over which
the United States and its allies have some influence.
This combination of inside and outside influence
may succeed in bringing about a relatively stable and
representative coalition that will be accepted by the
populace. As alluded to earlier, the post-war coalition
governments in Italy and France had a certain amount
of legitimacy because they were made up of anti-fascist forces. But the United States and the Soviet Union
also played a role in supporting their allies in these
coalitions and encouraging them, at least initially, to
cooperate with the other parties in the coalition.
2. The United States should promote that the coalition government be given both executive and legislative powers. Decisions should be reached by consensus, which will lead to a buy-in by all of the political
factions. These political forces will thus see the coalition government as “their” government, because
they will have an important role in the decisionmaking process. To avoid the appearance of domination
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by one faction over another, the head of the coalition
government should be rotated every 4 months or so.
The head of government, however, is merely a ceremonial position, and real power rests with the actual
coalition.
3. The United States should encourage the coalition government to enact reforms, immediately, that
show a clean break from the old regime. Emergency
laws should be abolished, and freedom of speech,
press, and assembly should be guaranteed. The coalition government should also emphasize rule of law
and end the practice of crony capitalism to show the
populace that the political parties are in favor of a
level playing field for all citizens. In this vein, the internal security services should be purged of those who
committed egregious human rights violations, and a
representative body should be chosen by the governing coalition to run the security services.
4. The governing coalition should pick a group of
jurists and nonjurists, representing the political factions in the coalition, to write a new constitution that
guarantees the freedoms mentioned earlier. Undoubtedly, there will be intense discussions about the role
of sharia in legislation, but Islamist and secularists,
because they are part of the ruling coalition, may be
more inclined to compromise with each other than
if they were not in the same government. After the
drafting of the constitution, the document should be
put before the people in a national referendum. The
United States should speak out about the need for
the constitution to guarantee universal freedoms, but
it should avoid commenting on sharia, because that
would touch a raw nerve and is likely to be counterproductive.69
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5. The United States should privately encourage
the delay of presidential and parliamentary elections
for at least 3 years. It would find the most receptivity
for this delay among the secular parties, which would
be starting out with a disadvantage politically and
would want the time to build their parties, develop a
coherent ideology and party platform, and organize
outside of the main cities. The United States is likely to
find the most resistance to the delay from Islamist parties, which would want elections sooner rather than
later to take advantage of their grass-roots appeal.70
As long as the ruling coalition government retains a
non-Islamist majority, the secular forces should be
able to put off Islamist calls for early elections. If the
governing coalition does enact political and economic
reforms, the populace might be content in seeing the
coalition government continue for this 3-year period
and not clamor for elections. Moreover, a relatively
long period for a coalition government would work to
equalize the political parties in the eyes of the populace. Secular parties that were not well known prior
to the revolution or ones that had been formed at the
start of the revolution would now be seen as on equal
footing as the Islamist parties, which presumably had
been more well known to the populace.
6. The United States should encourage American and European nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) involved in democracy promotion to assist
political parties of all ideological persuasions (Islamist
and secularist) in these countries to develop effective
political party strategies, such as messaging, campaigning, and recruitment. If particular Arab countries
reject these NGOs as “interfering in their countries’
internal affairs,”71 the United States should weigh in
with the ruling coalition to underscore the fact that
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such efforts benefit all parties. If these U.S. appeals
do not work, the United States should encourage the
political parties to send some of their cadres to the
United States for training by these NGOs.
7. As in the case now with Tunisia, the United States
should reward the governing coalition politically and
economically. The United States should praise the development of a progressive constitution and its passage by the public, the settlement of disputes peacefully through coalition politics, and the enactment of
political and economic reforms. The U.S. administration can also encourage the U.S. Congress to provide
loan guarantees and bilateral direct aid to the country,
which will help it deal with pressing problems like
infrastructure and unemployment. All of these policies will put the governing coalition in a good light.
By the time elections are held, the secular parties will
be held in as high esteem as the Islamist party, and
chances are they will do well in the electoral contests
because they will be seen as responsible and working
for the welfare of the people. They will no longer be
seen as merely debating clubs of urban intellectuals.
Hence, they would stand a good chance of remaining
a part of, and even becoming a dominant force in, a
new ruling coalition. If the secularists do come out
on top after the elections, the United States should
use its influence with them not to turn against the Islamists and to allow the Islamists to continue to have
a stake in the new political system by participating in
future elections.
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Dealing with Countries that are Already Highly
Polarized in Which Politics Is a Zero-Sum Game.
The most difficult scenario for U.S. policymakers
is the one Egypt experienced during the Morsi presidency (2012-13) and is currently experiencing under
military/secular rule (2013-14), when exclusionary
politics is the name of the game. The winning side
believes that the losing side is not only its opponent,
but its enemy, which needs to be suppressed. How
can the United States maneuver through this sharp
and exclusionary divide and still maintain its interests
and values?
1. The United States should be consistent on human
rights issues, no matter which side is committing the
abuses. As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons
the U.S. standing fell to a low point in Egypt, particularly among secular elements, was because the United
States failed to criticize Morsi’s November 22, 2012,
decree that set him above the law. U.S. quiescence was
interpreted as U.S. support for Morsi’s policies, while
conspiracy theories abounded about some type of secret, back room deal between the United States and the
Brotherhood. Although the United States was grateful
to Morsi for helping to broker the Hamas-Israel truce
just days earlier, foreign policy cooperation should not
trump an egregious act like the November 22 decree.
In addition, when violence is committed by both sides
of the divide, the United States should acknowledge
this fact as well. For example, it was proper for U.S.
officials to condemn the mid-August 2013 crackdown
on pro-Morsi demonstrators in which more than 500
died in a single day,72 but U.S. officials should also
have condemned the killing of 42 policemen on that
day as well. Granted, there was a large difference in
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the numbers of those killed, but some of the pro-Morsi protestors did have arms and used them against
the security forces, so at least some of the pro-Morsi
demonstrators were not innocent victims.
2. The United States also needs to be consistent in
advocating inclusionary politics. When Morsi was in
power, it appears that the United States did not press
Morsi or the Muslim Brotherhood to bring secular oppositionists into the government until very late in the
game, mid-June 2013,73 only a couple of weeks before
Morsi was overthrown. Whether Morsi would have
listened to the United States earlier remains an open
question. Even if he would not have done so, at least
the effort by the United States to push for an inclusionary outcome may have lessened the virulent anti-U.S.
sentiment that surfaced in June and July 2013. After
Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military, U.S. and
EU diplomats did try to convince Defense Minister alSissi and the interim civilian government to not crack
down violently on the Morsi supporters and to reach
some type of political arrangement with them, but to
no avail.74
3. The United States should understand that Egypt
(and countries that might be in a similar situation one
day) is still undergoing a revolutionary period. Historically, revolutions go through different phases, and
legalisms are often their first casualty. For example,
Mubarak’s ouster by the Egyptian military in February 2011—with power transferring to the SCAF—was
technically an illegal act. Under the then-existing
Egyptian constitution, power should have been transferred to the speaker of parliament, who would rule
for 60 days, followed by new elections for president.
But in the heyday of revolutionary euphoria, no one
questioned this power transfer, including the United
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States, which was pleased that Mubarak had finally
stepped down and a pro-U.S. military would rule in
his place until elections for parliament and president
would be held. In June 2013, as Egypt was in the midst
of arguably a second revolution—this time against
Morsi—the U.S. response was legalistic. Impending
street protests were criticized by U.S. officials; instead,
the message was to work for political parties.75 In a
normal situation, this might have been sound advice,
but by June 2013, with millions of Egyptians taking to
the streets to demand Morsi’s resignation, Egypt was
in the midst of additional revolutionary upheaval. In
such a situation, U.S. officials should have sided with
the demonstrators because they represented the majority of the populace. Even though Morsi had been
elected democratically, he acted in an authoritarian
manner; with the United States calling on Egyptians
to stick with Morsi for another 3 years, this message
was viewed in Egypt as a policy of having the populace to continue to suffer under authoritarian and
incompetent rule.
4. U.S. officials should also understand that in a
highly polarized political environment, it is impossible to please both sides. The United States can either
downgrade relations and cut off assistance to the winning side to show its dissatisfaction with the winning
side’s repressive actions or continue its relations with
the winning side in the hope that the leverage that
comes with such a relationship can be used to decrease
the suppression of the losing side. Either way, the idea
is to make the winning side less repressive. In the case
of some countries that are very prideful of their history, like Egypt, maintaining a working relationship
with the regime is usually preferable to cutting off aid
because the latter policy will cause a nationalist backlash and ultimately hinder U.S. leverage.76
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5. In a highly polarized environment, the president of the transition country is usually the one who
is the most polarizing figure, as he represents the best
or worst of a particular ideology, depending on one’s
point of view. Hence, it is important for outside countries like the United States to work with parliaments
as a check on the excesses of a president. Prior to the
Arab Spring, most parliaments in the Arab world were
merely mouthpieces of the ruling regime, but postArab Spring, parliaments have become more diverse
and more independent of the presidency. Moreover,
the new constitutions that have emerged and will
emerge in Arab transition countries also tend to give
more power to parliaments than they had in the past.
The United States can also increase funding for its Visitors Program, which brings foreign legislators to this
country as a way of persuading them of the benefits of
political inclusivity.
Additionally, U.S. officials should encourage the
new regime to live up to the liberal clauses in its new
constitution, which was substantially rewritten in late2013 and passed by public referendum in early-2014.
Except for the clauses that give the military and the
police wide autonomy, the constitution is a progressive document in which liberal freedoms (of speech,
the press, and assembly) are protected.77 It should
be the duty of the new Egyptian parliament that will
likely be elected in early 2015 to see to it that laws are
in conformity to the constitution. If they are not, they
should be removed. For example, there are still laws
on the books that state a citizen can be arrested for
“defaming Egypt.” Such a law can be so broadly interpreted that it can easily be used to stifle political
dissent. The United States can also use the advent of
parliamentary elections to push for as much inclusiv-
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ity as possible. Although there is little to no chance
that the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and
Justice party, will be allowed to run in these elections-and U.S. advocacy on this party’s behalf will likely
backfire--the United States can and should push for
as much political inclusivity as possible. This means
allowing non-Brotherhood Islamists like the various
Salafi parties to participate in the elections so that
these elections are not simply a contest among secularists. Over time, once the new parliament is ensconced
and the terrorist threat subsides, the government may
be more willing to countenance even more inclusivity.
6. In a society under secular rule that is facing a
genuine terrorist threat from Islamist militants, like
Egypt today, it is unlikely that the United States will
be able to convince the authorities that the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist organization” is both wrong and counterproductive
until the terrorist threat is brought under control. As
long as terrorist acts are taking place in the country,
the authorities will tend to lump all Islamist groups
together. Given such strong sentiments, U.S. policymakers must understand that they cannot realistically
change the Egyptian government’s attitude and policies toward the Brotherhood. Hence, the United States
and Egypt, at least over the short term, will have to
“agree to disagree” on the Brotherhood. What the
United States can do (in conjunction with the EU) is
to criticize the Egyptian government when it undertakes egregious human rights violations (such as the
quick trials in the spring of 2014 in which hundreds
of Brotherhood activists and supporters were given
the death penalty), the arrests of journalists for simply
doing their job of reporting on opposition activities,
and the arrests of young activists for demonstrating
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in the streets against the military. Egypt’s new regime
wants to gain international legitimacy, and, by withholding full legitimacy through the condemnation of
such arrests, the United States and the EU can hold the
regime to a certain standard.
7. U.S. economic assistance, in a highly polarized
environment, should be geared to a high-visibility
project that would be seen as benefiting the people
over the regime. In this way, the United States can
help enhance its image in the country and mitigate the
suspicions that the United States favors one side over
another in the societal divide.
8. During sharp Islamist-secularist polarization,
which is usually accompanied by human rights abuses, the United States should review its military aid to
that country to ensure that no U.S. military items are
being used for the suppression of internal dissent. If
U.S. military items have been found to be used for this
purpose, the United States should discontinue any
further deliveries of such items and should warn the
authorities that continued use of them for such purposes would adversely affect future aid.
9. In general, however, U.S. military aid to countries undergoing polarization should not be cut, because doing so would lessen U.S. leverage either with
the regime in power or with that country’s military establishment. In particular, if a country is facing an Islamist terrorist threat during heightened polarization,
cutting military aid—especially aid that can be used
for counterterrorism purposes—can work against
U.S. interests, because it will embolden the terrorist
groups and give the perception, especially among secularists in the society, that the United States is somehow secretly in league with the Islamists to take over
the country.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
The following suggestions for the U.S. Army will
preserve and enhance the bilateral security relationship between the United States and Arab transition
countries facing political polarization, such as Egypt.
Background.
Many of the countries in the Arab world, including
those going through transitions, have had long security relationships with the United States. Such relationships have often involved the sale of U.S. military
hardware to the military establishments of these countries (especially to their armies, which represent the
largest segment of their armed forces), joint military
exercises, the sharing of intelligence for counterterrorism purposes, and, increasingly, help with counterterrorism operations.
Within the Islamist-secularist divide, the military
establishments of these countries are usually on the
side of the secularists, because they have long seen
the Islamists not only as a threat, but as having loyalties outside of the nation-state.78 Hence, it has been a
long-held view of these military establishments that
Islamists should not be allowed to join the officer
corps, and one of the main tasks of military intelligence in these countries has been to weed out those
officers who were suspected of having been members or supporters of Islamist organization like the
Muslim Brotherhood and even more radical Islamist
groups. During his presidency, Morsi tried to change
this prohibition, and pressed the military to include
some young Brotherhood members into the military
academies.79 It is likely that this action was one of the
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reasons Morsi’s relations with al-Sissi, whom he had
picked to be Defense Minister in August 2012, soured
over time.
U.S. Army officers should understand, however,
that the opposition of many Arab military establishments to Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood
does not mean that the officer corps in these countries
is not religious. In fact, many career officers, including
al-Sissi, are believed to be quite devout.80 Many of the
wives of Egyptian military officers wear the hijab (the
conservative head cover), and most of these officers
observe Ramadan (the Islamic holy month of fasting).
They differentiate between personal religiosity, which
they support, and the use of religion for political
purposes, which they oppose.
Recommendations.
1. During a period of intense polarization between
Islamists and secularists, Arab military officers may
lecture their U.S. army counterparts about the “threat”
posed by Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and express sentiments to the effect that the U.S.
political authorities are “naïve” in believing the Muslim Brotherhood is a nonviolent group. Because this
is a complicated issue and the United States does not
agree with the Egyptian and other Arab governments
like those of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that the Brotherhood is a terrorist organization,
it would be best that U.S. Army officers stay clear of
such discussions with their Egyptian and other Arab
military counterparts as much as possible.
2. Instead, U.S. Army officers should try to focus
their discussions with their Arab military counterparts
on actual terrorist threats, such as al-Qaeda affiliated
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groups that are operating in the Sinai Peninsula, like
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which have not only attacked
Egyptian military and police units, but foreign tourists as well. Such groups have also attacked government officials and installations in Cairo and other
more populated areas of Egypt.
3. Helping Egypt and other Arab countries deal
with their actual terrorist threats would not only mitigate Islamist-secularist divisions in these countries
but boost the U.S. standing there. It would help to focus the military in these countries on the real terrorist
threat, not on nonviolent Islamist groups, and this renewed focus might work to ease up the repression of
the latter. Moreover, by helping to focus the Egyptian
military on operations in the Sinai, U.S. Army officers
would help restore and refurbish the Egyptian military’s reputation of protecting the nation from foreign
threats and foreign-linked enemies, as opposed to
playing a divisive role in domestic politics.
4. The more the U.S. Army can give advice, logistical support, and military equipment to help the Egyptian military put down the terrorist threat in the Sinai,
the more the Egyptian people will see the United States
as playing a helping hand in bringing about domestic
stability. This stability will make tourism rebound (increasing jobs and revenue) and attract more foreign
investment into the country. Pacification of the Sinai is
thus extremely important on many levels, and the U.S.
Army (including its special forces) is best equipped to
offer this type of assistance.
5. In addition, because of the knowledge gained
by the U.S. Army in counterterrorism operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it can bring to bear the lessons
learned in those conflicts to the Egyptian Sinai context, and against Islamist extremists operating in Tunisia and Libya. Furthermore, U.S. Army officers can
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also warn their Egyptian counterparts, for example,
about counterterrorism policies that can be counterproductive. These include punishing a whole Bedouin
village—and demolishing homes there—in the Sinai,
because one or two of this village’s youth are believed
to have aided the terrorists. Such practices by some
Egyptian Army units, which have come to light in the
press, can create more enemies than they intended.81
6. Although some Egyptian and other Arab military officers, for nationalistic reasons, may resent such
advice from their U.S. Army counterparts, their ultimate goal is to end the terrorist threat emanating from
the Sinai (in the case of Egypt) and other troublesome
regions in their countries, and they may come around
and accept this advice. In this regard, the U.S. Army
should favor increasing the number of Egyptian military officers coming to the United States for training at
U.S. professional military educational institutes. Part
of this training should involve effective ways to conduct counterterrorism operations, and another part
should include the benefits of civilian control over the
military and the military’s respect for human rights.
By helping the Egyptian military put down the terrorist threat in the Sinai, having it return to its proper
role of defending the nation against external threats,
and lessening its involvement in domestic affairs, the
United States will not only help mitigate the polarization in Egypt and similar societies but rebuild the bilateral security relationship that has frayed since the
ouster of Morsi in July 2013.
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